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SEPARATE OBSCENITY STANDARD FOR YOUTH: POTENTIAL COURT ESCAPE ROUTE FROM ITS "SUPERCENSOR"
ROLE
I.

INTRODUcTION

Obscenity legislation to date has generally been either effective and unconstitutional or constitutional and ineffective.1 Various pressure groups;
have persuaded lawmakers to enact general obscenity legislation 3 ostensibly
for the protection of impressionable youth and often at the expense of
adult rights of free speech and due process. In response, the United States
Supreme Court has marked well the constitutional guidelines 4 and has
suggested the solution; 5 but it has been unwilling so far to assume the full
legislative responsibility. Consequently, there is unnecessary legislative
uncertainty; and the Supreme Court now finds itself in the unpalatable
position of "supercensor." The purpose of this note is to advocate an
alternative approach to the obscenity problem, tailored to a specific and
constitutionally justifiable purpose-the protection of youth. There would
seem to be no reason why a separate standard for children could not be
both constitutional and effective. If such be the case, a progressive and
skillful legislature could simultaneously insure the welfare of its youth
and eliminate the abridgment of adult constitutional rights. Moreover, a
well-drafted statute might even provide the Supreme Court with an escape
route from its current "supercensor's" role.
1 It is the author's contention that obscenity legislation effectiveness must be measured
by its success in controlling the dissemination of obscenity, primarily in printed or
motion picture form. To date, most effective laws have been ruled unconstitutional as a
suppression of free speech protected by the first amendment or due process as guaranteed
by the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Conversely, those laws which have conformed
to constitutional requisites have been too narrow in their application to encompass any
but the patently obscene material, thereby protecting no one from obscenity distributors.
The author believes that neither of the above types of legislation is worthy of consideration. The major premise upon which this note is based, however, is that a legislature

can enact an obscenity control scheme which will protect that segment of society for
which such laws are primarily designed and at the same time minimize the impact on
the adult community, both distributor and consumer. Such a scheme is the separate
obscenity standard for children.
2 E.g., Citizens for Decent Literature, which claims over 300 chapters (printed material)
and the Catholic Legion of Decency, which classifies each motion picture according to its
About
obscenity standard. See generally Krueger, Fair Comment: What's All This ---Pornography?,40 LA B. Buu.m 505 (1965).
3 From the mid-nineteenth century until most recently, free speech in the area of
obscenity and due process in coping with obscenity were primarily matters handled at
the local level in accordance with the community conscience. See generally ER
SCmVARTZ, CENsoRstmp: THE SEARCH FOR THE OBSCENE (1965).

See generally cases cited notes 41-52 infra.
5 See note 119 and accompanying text infra.
4
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II. Two TsT PLANs
As a preview to an examination of the problems and possibilities inherent in any separate obscenity legislation plan, it is instructive to look
briefly at two such schemes currently on the United States Supreme Court's
docket.
"Not Suitable for Young Persons": The Dallas Movie Ordinance
The City of Dallas passed a municipal ordinance requiring all movies
shown in the city to be classified by a nine member board as either
"suitable for young people" or "not suitable for young people."O Films
which received the latter classification were required to be so advertised 7
by the exhibiting theater and children under tie age of 16 were barred
from admission. 8 Sanctions imposed on recalcitrant exhibitors included
6 DALLAs, TEX., R-v. CODE ch. 46A. § l(f) (1960):
"Not suitable for young persons" means:

(1) Describing or portraying such brutality, criminal violence or depravity in such
a manner as to be, in the judgment of the Board, likely to incite or encourage crime
or delinquency on the part of young persons; or
(2) Describing or portraying nudity beyond the customary limits of candor in the
community, or sexual promiscuity or extra-marital or abnormal sexual relations in
such a manner as to be, in the judgment of the Board, likely to incite or encourage

delinquency or sexual promiscuity on the part of young persons or to appeal to their
prurient interest.
A film shall be considered "likely to incite or encourage" crime delinquency or
sexual promiscuity on the part of young persons, if, in the judgment of the Board,
there is a substantial probability that it will create the impression on young persons
that such conduct is profitable, desirable, acceptable, respectable, praiseworthy or
commonly accepted. A film shall be considered as appealing to "prurient interest"
of young persons, if in the judgment of the Board, its calculated or dominant effect
on young persons is substantially to arouse sexual desire. In determining whether a
film is "not suitable for young persons," the Board shall consider the film as a
whole, rather than isolated portions, and shall determine whether its harmful effects
outweigh artistic or educational values such film may have for young persons.
(Emphasis added.)
The italics indicate that portion of the classification standard which was found acceptable
by the District and Fifth Circuit Courts.
7 "'Advertisement' means any commercial promotional material initiated by the
exhibitor designed to bring a film to the public attention or to increase [ticket sales],
whether by newspaper, billboard, motion picture, television, radio, Or other media within
or originatingwithin the City of Dallas." (Emphasis added.) Id. at § 46A-l(h). See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas and United Artists Corp. v. City of Dallas, 402 S.W.2d 770
(rex. Ct. Civ. App. 5th Sup. Jud. Dist. 1966), cert. applied for, 35 U.S.L.W. 8313 (U.S.
Mar. 7, 1967) (No. 1109) and 35 U.S.L.W. 3331 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1967) (No. 1155).
8 Section 46A-4 (Offenses) makes it unlawful to show an unclassified film, to show a
"not suitable" film if any advertisement fails to clearly state classification, to show "not
suitable" film without prominently posting classification on theater front, to knowingly
sell or give a ticket for a "not suitable" film to any young person (whom § 40A-l(d)
defines as under sixteen), to knowingly allow any young person to view a "not suitable"
film, to show any film dip covered by the above prohibitions at any showing of a
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license suspension or revocation. 9 The ordinance was twrice reviewed by
the District Court, 10 the second time with adjustments dictated by the
former decision, 1 before reaching the Supreme Court through the appellate process. The District Court in the second review,' 2 after performing
some rather extensive judicial surgery, 13 held the ordinance constitutional
to the extent that the classification "not suitable" was restricted to films
deemed ". . . obscene when viewed by young persons."'14 The court then
defined such an objectionable film as:
A film that..

.

when viewed by an audience of young persons is one

which, to the average young person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to the prurient interest, substantially goes beyond the

customary limits of candor in description or representation of such
matters to the average young person, and is utterly without redeeming

social importance.' 5
"suitable" film if such clip has not been edited and classified itself as "suitable," to
falsely or misleadingly propose a "suitable" classification for a film known to be "not

suitable," or to show any film classified "not suitable" without having an appropriate
license. DALLAs, TEx., REv. CODE § 46A-4 (1960). This latter offense was all but emasculated when the court struck down the sanction for violating the ordinance. Id. at
§ 46A-6 (Revocation and Suspension of License). This provision allowed the City Attorney
or any group of ten Dallas citizens to lodge a complaint with the City Council alleging
that a particular exhibitor had violated any of the above restrictions, whereafter on the
basis of sufficient evidence the City Council was authorized to revoke or suspend the
exhibitor's license to show "not suitable" pictures for up to one year. It should be noted
that these films were, in most instances, not obscene for adults.
9 Ibid.
10 Compare Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 247 F. Supp. 906, 911 (N.D. Tex.

1965) (ordinance void for failure to safeguard exhibitors' constitutional rights), with
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 249 F. Supp. 19, 25 (N.D. Tex. 1965) (ordinance,
though partially void, constitutional since procedural safeguards adequately insured).
Both cases were heard by the same judge, involved the same litigants, and adjudicated
the constitutionality of the same ordinance. They are distinguishable only in the fact
that, in the latter instance, the Dallas ordinance had been amended to provide for
constitutionally adequate film screening procedures and speedy judicial review of
contested classifications.
11 The principal alteration was introduction of speedy judicial review guarantee.
But see Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 366 F.2d 590, 601 (1966). petition for
cert. filed, 35 U.S.L.W. 3245 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1967) (No. 971), 35 U.S.L.W. 3255 (US. Jan.
24, 1967) (dissent) (no means whereby Dallas can guarantee speedy state court review).
12 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 249 F. Supp. 19 (N.D. Tex. 19r), afd,
366 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1966).
1.3
Id. at 24-25. The District Court voided so much of the "not suitable" classification
as did not refer to obscenity and held unconstitutional and void tie sanction which
denied a recalcitrant exhibitor license to show "adult only" pictures. See also Butler v.
Michigan, 352 US. 380 (1967).
14 See note 6 supra.
15 249 F. Supp. 19, 24 (N.D. Tex. 1965).
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The District Court's surgery on the definitional aspects of the ordinance
was accompanied by its equally adroit footwork in the area of protecting
exhibitors' rights to freedom of speech and procedural due process.1 0 The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court decision, holding
constitutional a movie classification ordinance to protect impressionable
young persons so long as the ordinance is restricted to films classified
obscene when viewed by young persons and provided also that it is accompanied by adequate safeguards for the exhibitors' rights of freedom
7
of speech and due process.

The New York Approach to the Magazine Rack Problem

There are several New York cases before the United States Supreme
Court on appeal's which have construed the unique, "graphically descriptive, rather than definitional," statutory approach that New York has taken
to combat the dissemination of "objectionable materials" 10 to young
16 Judge Hughes found that the state courts in practice allowed preferential docket
treatment to comply with the speedy judicial review requirements of Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). Final judgment could be obtained in less than 35 days from the
Texas Supreme Court. But see 366 F.2d at 610 (dissent) (guarantees only precatory).
17 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 366 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. granted,
35 U.S.L.W. 3245 (U.S. Feb. 3, 1967) (no. 971).
18 E.g., Ginzburg v. New York, - N.Y.2d (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. 1967), cert. applied
for, 35 U.S.L.W. 3271 (U.S. Feb. 7, 1967) (No. 1022); Tannenbaum v. New York, 18 N.Y.2d
268 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. 1966), cert. applied for, 35 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Jan. 31, 1967)
(No. 993); all involve N.Y. PEN. LAw § 484-i (1965).
19 Ibid. The statute reads:
Any person who knowingly sells, lends or gives away to a person actually or
apparently under the age of eighteen years:
1. any photograph, drawing or similar representation, whether singly or In sets
or contained in books, "pocket books," pamphlets or magazines, or any motion
picture film, of any person or persons of the age of puberty or older, posed or
presented in such a manner as to exploit lust for commercial gain and which would
appeal to the lust of persons under the age of eighteen years or to their curiosity
as to sex or to the anatomical differences between the sexes and which shows, depicts
or reveals such person or persons:
(a) with less than a fully opaque covering of his or her genitals, pubic areas or
buttocks, and, if that person is a female, with less than a fully opague covering
of any portion of the breast below a point immediately above the top of the areola,
or
(b) with his or her genitals in a state or condition of sexual stimulation or
arousal, or
(c) engaged in an act or acts of masturbation, homosexuality, or sexual Intercourse, or in physical contact with another person's genitals, pubic areas,
buttock or buttocks or the breast or breasts of a female, or
2. any collection, series or combination of photographs, drawings or similar
representations, whether or not contained in books, "pocket books," "pamphlets or
magazines, or any motion picture film, of any person or persons of the age of puberty
or older, posed or presented in such a manner as to exploit lust for commercial gain
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people under 18 years old. The philosophy behind the New York statute
has best been expressed by Mr. Edward Cavanagh, then Deputy Mayor of
New York City:
I suggest that every state in the Union needs a statute that is graphically descriptive of what is objectionable for those under 18, and
that makes no attempt to define obscenity-a dearly impossible task.2°
In essence, the New York statute is an anti-exhibition approach which
focuses on materials depicting certain parts of the human anatomy2 or
narratives describing sexually stimulating activity.2 2 The sale or distribution of such materials to a young person under 18 constitutes a misdemeanor.23
III. PURPOSE iN PRsPcrivE
Whenever obscenity controls are debated, two crucial questions always
arise: how is obscenity defined and why should it be controlled? Although
a multitude of definitions have been attempted, the former question has
never been satisfactorily answered.2 4 Nevertheless, while the various pressure groups have their own respective reasons for controlling obscenity,23
and depicted or shown in such a posture or way that the viewer's attention or concentration is primarily focused on that person's or those persons' genitals, pubic
areas, buttock or buttocks, female breast or breasts, and which would appeal to the
lust of persons under the age of eighteen years or to their curiosity as to sex or to
the anatomical differences between the sexes, or
3. any book, "pocket book," pamphlet or magazine, phonograph record, tape or
similar electronic reproduction of sound, containing details, descriptions, or narrative
accounts of:
(a) the genitals in a state or condition of sexual stimulation or arousal, or
(b) acts of masturbation, or
(c) acts of homosexuality, or
(d) acts of sexual intercourse, or
(e) acts of physical contact with another person's genitals, pubic areas, buttock
or buttocks or the breast or breasts of a female, which contact is made in an act
of sexual stimulation, gratification or perversion
which details, descriptions or narrative accounts are written or presented in such
a manner as to exploit lust for commercial gain and which would appeal to the
lust of persons under the age of eighteen years or to their curiosity as to sex or to
the anatomical differences between the sexes and which are to be distinguished from
fiat and factual statements of the facts, causes, functions or purposes of the subject
of the writing or presentation, such as would be found in bona fide medical or
biological textbooks, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
20 Cavanagh, This Flood of Filth, 113 AmEmcA 184 (1965).
21 N.Y. PEN. LAw § 484-i(l)-(2) (1965).
22 Id. at § 484-i(3).
23 Id. at § 484-i.
24 Lockhart and McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38
MiNN. L. REv. 295, 320 (1954).
25 See Murphy, The Value of Pornography, 10 WAYNE L. REv. 655 (1964), listing four
reasons:
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at least one common justification has appeared in nearly every set of

reasons answering the latter question, i.e., the impressionable young mind
needs protection from a distorted initial exposure to sex.20
What Is Obscenity?
As Professors Lockhart and McClure, the recognized authorities in this
field,27 have long contended, "no one seems to know what obscenity is."2 8
They noted further that "many writers have discussed the obscene, but
few can agree upon its essential nature." 29 After alluding to why a definition of obscenity is almost impossible, they also examined Zachariah
Chafee's reasons why. His reasons were (1) sex is irrational, not logical "is
is law, (2) law always seeks to protect a common standard which, with
obscenity, does not exist, and (3) the idea of obscenity is a complex combination of offensiveness, ideology, and sexual stimuli.80 Confronted by
such an impossible task as justifying an obscenity decision, Mr. Justice
Potter Stewart accurately summed up the judges' problem when he exclaimed in his concurring opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio:
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I
understand to be embraced within that shorthand description [hard.
core pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly
doing so. But I know it when I see it. (Emphasis added.)31
This frustratingly subjective, almost cavalier, approach to the definitional
problem by scholar and judge alike has left legislatures confused and distributors apprehensive.
(1) pornography leads directly to violence or public offenses.
(2) normal people reject it.
(3) children should be kept isolated from sexual knowledge.
(4) pornography is uniform with a uniform effect.
See also, Kalven, Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SuPREME CouRT Rav, 1, 3-4,
listing four slightly different reasons:
(1) pornography incites antisocial sex conduct.
(2) it produces psychological excitement by sexual imagery.
(3) it arouses the feelings of revulsion and disgust.
(4) it advocates improper sex values.
26 Wertham, Mass Media and Sex Deviation, in SLOVENKO, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND TiE
LAW 829 (1965).
27 See generally Lockhart and McClure, Obscenity Censorship: The Core Constitutional
Issue-What Is Obscene?, 7 UT.n L. Rxv. 289 (1961); Censorship of Obscenity: The
Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5 (1960); Literature, The Law of
Obscenity and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REv. 295 (1954).
28 Id. at 320.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., quoting from Chafee, Freedom of Expression in Literature, 200 ANNAts 76

(1938).
31 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.).
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Perhaps the most perceptive analysis of obscenity-though not an attempt to define it per se-was attributed by Professor Lockhart, in a recent
speech,32 to the noted American anthropologist, Margaret Mead:
The Material of true pornography [which is obscenity in supposedly
artistic form] is compounded of daydreams themselves, composed without regard for any given reader or looker, to stimulate or titillate. It
bears the signature of non-participation--of the dreaming adolescent,
:. . desperately concentrating on unusualness, on drawing that which
is not usually drawn, writing words on a plaster wall, shifting scenes
and actors about, to evoke and feed an impulse that has no object;
no object .. . because the adolescent is not yet old enough to seek
33
sexual partners.

The essential element which distinguishes, even if it does not define
obscenity, according to Miss Mead, is "the daydream as distinct from real-

ity."3 4 This "fantasy" approach to describing obscenity is basically an admission (as was Justice Stewart's opinion) that, while obscenity might not
be dearly definable, it is nevertheless readily recognizable.36 Moreover, the
recognition of the nature of obscenity naturally gives rise to the second of
the crucial questions.
Why Control Obscenity?
Impressionable and immature young minds must be protected from
exposure to a distorted sex-in-fantasy before they are adequately introduced 36 to sex-in-reality. Unfortunately, many lawmakers have unneces-

sarily obscured this universally recognized purpose underlying obscenity
legislation by attempting to solve the youth protection problem by resorting to general legislation applicable to the adult population as well.z
32 Published as Lockhart and McClure, Obscenity Censorship: The Core Constitutional
Issue-What Is Obscene?, 7 UTAH L Rnv. 289 (1961).
33 Id. at 296.
34 Ibid.
35 The major constitutional problem with this recognition aspect of obscenity is who
would be vested with the authority to so recognize.
36 Masters and Johnson, Sex and Sexuality: The Crucial Difference, McCall's, Nov.
11, 1966, p. 32.
The concept of sex without the wider dimensions of emotional readiness, tenderness and warmth does not turn boys and girls into adults, but into underprivileged people who will never know the glorious meaning of mature adult
sexuality. (Italics added.)
Id. at 34.
37 Multi-purpose obscenity legislation invariably exceeds constitutionally acceptable
limits, thereby invalidating the valid youth protection purpose for tie sake of less valid
purposes. Cf. Butier v. Michigan, 352 US. 380 (1957).
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Such a comprehensive plan invariably infects the statute with constitutional
infirmities38 which a well-drafted special act could readily avoid.
While any attempt to handle the first question unavoidably sets the stage
for numerous constitutional challenges, the special act approach to the
latter question provides a justifiable89 basis for judicial application of the
"balancing of interests" test.4 0 However, before any special separate standard legislation is drafted, the careful legislator should review just how
general obscenity legislation has fared with the Supreme Court to date.
1V. OBSCENITY AND THE SUPREME COURT

Obscenity: Definitional and Contextual
Not until Roth v. United States, 41 in 1957, did the United States Supreme

Court initially make a decision upon the issue of the constitutionality of
obscenity legislation.4 2 Prior to this time, the American obscenity censorship pendulum had swung between "Comstockianism" 43 and the WoolseyHand doctrine 4 --a modification of the traditional English test. Roth
was a bombshell in American constitutional law, as it was the first depar-

ture from the otherwise inviolate "clear and present langer" test 0 which
spelled out the only justification for an abridgment of the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech. By means of a sophisticated two-level

38 Ibid.
39 Society has a responsibility for the protection of its youth. Prince v. Common.
wealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
40 Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YAL L.J. 877
(1963):
The formula is that the court must ... balance the individual and social interest
in freedom of expression against the individual and social interest sought by the
regulation which restricts expression.
Id. at 912.
41 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
42 Kalven, Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SuPREmE CouRT REV. 1.
43 Anthony Comstock organized the YMCA Committee for Suppression of Vice. From

this base, he established the Society for the Suppression of Vice which, in 1873, was
instrumental in getting Congress to pass a federal mail regulation act which barred
use of the mail to transfer obscene materials. Comstock became such a vengeful witchhunter that Bernard Shaw is said to have coined the term "Comstockery" to refer to
unrestricted censorship to suppress obscenity. See Krueger, supra note 2, at 505 n.1,
for a capsule discussion of Comstock.
44 Standard of the impact of the whole material upon the average member of the

audience. United States v. One Book "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), afl'd, 72
F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934) (WoolSey, J.) (most widely known lower federal court case
on obscenity); see also United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936) (L. Hand, J.);
United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (L. Hand, J.).
45 Queen v. Hicklin, [1868] 3 Q.B. 360 (isolated passage impact on most susceptible
recipient).
46 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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dichotomy, 47 the court managed to deny obscenity first amendment immunity. With his two-level concept, Mr. Justice Brennan, who wrote for
the Court, distinguished between works with social value and those without
social value.48 The former must be afforded constitutional protection; but
the latter, those which he described as being "utterly without redeeming
social importance," 49 did not warrant immunity from censorship. Although
the Roth decision did not specifically define exactly what constituted
"obscenity," it did establish the test which, with amplification"a and modification,51 has become the current American standard. Roth stated the
test to be:
Whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme taken as a whole appeals to prurient
52
interest.
Analysts have credited the Model Penal Code with influencing Brennan's
obscentiy standard. 3 Mr. Justice Brennan recently amplified his obscenity
rationale in a law review ardde 54 paying tribute to Professor Meiklejohn.53
47 Protected or unprotected speech is to be determined by the social

.alue

of state-

ment or subject matter. See Kalven, supra note 42, at 9.
48 Kalven, supra note 42, at 9-16.
49 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
50 See, e.g., Memoirs v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184 (1964).
51 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966) (pandering material as obscene
constitutes criminal obscenity; actual content notwithstanding); Mishkin v. New York,
383 U.S. 502 (1966) (exploitation of dearly deviant group overrides Roth average person

element).
52 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
53 Id. at 487 n.20 where Justice Brennan speaking for the Court stated:
We perceive no significant difference between the meaning of obscenity developed
in the case law and the definition of the Model Penal Code, 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft
No. 6, 1957), viz.: "A thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant
appeal is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex. ..
and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or
representation of such matters... '
See MURPHY, CENSORSHIP: GOVERNm N AND OnscENrry 25 (1963).
54 Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretationof the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1965).
55 Mr. Justice Brennan stated that all schools of thought-including Professor
Meiklejohn and Mr. Justice Black [absolutists]-agree substantially that the government

has some power to regulate the "how" and "where" of the exercise of expression-there
is no "absolute" freedom of speech guaranteed by the first amendment. Id. at 4-5. Cf.
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 578 (Black dissenting). He further interpreted Prof.
Meiklejohn's position to be that there should be no suppression of speech classified as
having governing social importance. Thereafter, he stated that, while Mei lejohn would
probably have decided against the government most of the cases decided under the
"dear and present danger" and "balancing of interests" tests, he would have been more
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Whatever rationale is ascribed to have influenced Mr. Justice Brennan's
decision, his Roth formula has been generally recognized to encompass
three distinct elements which are interpreted in accordance with a single
quasi-objective standard. 56 First, the impact of an allegedly obscene work
must be measured with reference to the average person.5 7 Second, the
dominant theme 8 of the material must be taken as a whole.60 Third, the
impact of the whole work on the average person must appeal to prurient
interest.6 0 These three elements are then balanced against the contemporary community standards6 l to determine into which of the two levels the
work finally falls: that which, as socially redeeming, is protected or that
which, as utterly without social value, fails to merit First Amendment protection.
The Roth approach was reaffirmed in Jacobellis v. Ohio when the
Court clarified the utterly without socially redeeming value element to be
directed at material which "goes substantially beyond the customary limits
of candor in description or representation [of sexual matters] .... ,02 Moreover, the Court in Jacobellis amplified contemporary community standards
to be those of "society-at-large" rather than each state or local govern.
mental entity. 63 In essence, what Jacobellis did was expand slightly its
unprotected category, while at the same time restricting its interpretation
by creating an arbitrary, quasi-objective standard-a national standard.
To tolerate locally devised standards would be to invite chaos where now
only mere uncertainty exists. The Court was only too well aware of the
problems multiple standards would create. 64 Failure to insist upon a national standard would permit the same material to be adjudged obscene in
one jurisdiction while it was considered acceptable in another, the situation in which Erskine Caldwell found his book, God's Little Acre, in the
stringent in the obscenity cases on the basis of lack of social importance. Brennan, supra
note 54, at 12-14.
56 See, e.g., Monaghan, Obscenity, 1966: The Marriage of Obscenity Per So and
Obscenity Per Quod, 76 YALEa L.J. 127 (1966); Semonche, Definitional and Contextual
Obscenity: The Supreme Court's New and Disturbing Accommodation, 13 U.CL.A.L.
REv. 1173 (1966).
57 Compare cases cited note 51 supra, with Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489
(1957). But cf. United States v. 31 Photographs, 156 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (dearly
obscene photos free to be used for legitimate research).
58 Roth v. United States, supra, at 489. But cf. Kingsley Corp. v. Regents of N.Y.U.,
360 U.S. 684 (1959) (theme of adultery not, by itself, obscene).
59 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
60 Ibid. See note 56, supra.
61 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). "Community" as used in Roth was
clarified in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 US. 184, 193 (1964), to mean a national, not a local,
standard.
62 Id. at 191.
63 Id. at 193.
04 See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946) (limits on free expression).
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jurisdictions of New York and Massachusetts.6 5 History has also illustrated
disparity with respect to movie censorship practices 00 Furthermore, the
Court aserted in Jacobellis that it had a duty to independently review de
novo each allegedly obscene work to insure that the Roth doctrine was
uniformly applied.6 7 Though occasionally assailed by free speech absolutists,6 8 the Roth doctrine was generally recognized to be a reasonable O
and narrowly applied 0 approach to the obscenity problem. While the test
was variously referred to as "definitional obscenity," 7' "obscenity per se," 72
and other labels, the fact that it was both based upon a narrowly construed
formula and interpreted finally by the Supreme Court rendered its application ineffective for child protection as a practical matter.73 In fact, the
Roth doctrine actually came to be relied upon by obscenity peddlers who
mistakenly deduced that it provide them with a convenient defense. 74
65 People v. Viking Press, 147 Misc. 813 (Mag. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1933) (not obscene); Atty.
Gen. v. "God's Little Acre," 326 Mass. 281, 93 N.E.2d 819 (1950) (obscene).
66 Note, 60 YALE L.J. 696 (1951) (abuses prevalent in movie censorship schemes before
1950's). For an interesting look at a foreign country which relies on local, rather than
national, controls see O'Brien, Movie Censorship: A Swiss Comparison, 1956 DUKa LJ.

633. The Swiss are opposed to any attempt to impose uniform censorship laws, and
they are willing to pay to maintain a viable federal governmental system.
67 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 189-90 (1964). The court, however, bitterly resented
the fact that for exercising its duty it should be "denigrated by such epithets as . . .
'super-censor."' Ibid.
68 E.g., Krueger, FairComment: What's All This - - - - About Pornography?.40 L.A.B.
BuLL. 505 (Aug. 1965); Murphy, The Value of Pornography, 10 WAYN L. Rnv. 655 (1964).
69 See Murphy, Censorship: Government and Obscenity (Helicon 1953). But ee, for
those who disagree with the Roth approach, Khronhausen, Pornography and the Law
(Ballantine 1964); Ernst and Schwartz, Censorship: The Search for the Obscene (MacMillan 1964).
70 Before the 1966 modifications to the Roth doctrine, it would apply to very few
materials. Thereafter, however, as Time Magazine, Apr. 1, 1966, pp. 56-58 said:
[The court was] catching up with the moral election returns [by developing] a new
combination of rules that seemed to offer a workable, constitutional w'ay to leave
serious literature uncensored but combat the pornographic racketeers.
Semonche, supra note 65, criticized these modifications as "[decisions] closer to a legislative
determination which enshrines an emotionally charged majority will" Id. at 1213.
71 Semonche, supra note 56.
72 Monaghan, supra note 56.
73 The pre-1966 Roth approach curbed almost nothing, leaving children exposed to
everything to which adults had access.
74 Ralph Ginzburg even raised Roth as a defense, claiming that even though he was
advertising himself as a source of self-recognized obscene material, since his advertisements themselves were not obscene under the Roth standard, he could not be held
criminally liable. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). The Mishkin defense
was also based on a claim that the Roth "average person" element precluded the Court's
objecting to publication specifically for a deviant group. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S.
502 (1966). Compare Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day. 370 U.S. 478 (1952) (homosexual
magazine held not "utterly" without redeeming social value).
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But while Roth may have been somewhat encouraging to the commercial
smut distributor, the Supreme Court decisions of March 21, 196675 struck
them with stark fear.7 6 For these decisions marked an expansion of the
Roth definitional approach to include a "variable" 77 or "contextual ob7
scenity. 78 In Memoirs v. Attorney General of Massachusetts,
D
the Court

once again spelled out the Roth criteria:
Under this definition, as elaborated in subsequent cases, three elements
must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the dominant theme of

the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex;
(b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary
community standards relating to the description or representation of
sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming
social value.

The Court thereupon employed the Memoirs case as a transitional device
to illustrate their expanded formula. Fanny Hill, as the book before the
Court in Memoirs was popularly known, was a literary classic with merit
and a socially redeeming theme: "sex with love is superior to sex in a
brothel."8 0 Hence, on its own merits, Fanny Hill was not obscene under
the Roth criteria. But the Court added, alluding to Memoirs two compan-

ion cases,81 a book in itself not obscene might be nevertheless utterly
without social value if it were commercially exploited for its prurient appeal.82 Thus the Court indicated that the same work may conceivably be
subjected to tests for "obscenity per se" and "obscenity per quod."8 Marketing techniques therefore, became a critical factor, as the companion
cases would dramatically indicate.
75 Memoirs v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Ginzburg v. United States, 383
U.S. 463 (1966); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
76 See N.Y. Times, April 19, 1966, p. 42, col. 1, and N.Y. Times, March 27, 1966, § 4,

p. 3, col. 1:
Times Square bookstores, often effective barometers of the legal climate in the field
of sexual literature, responded to the new decisions by rearranging their displays
and back-shelving their hotter items. . . . [T]he New York City Police Department
reported that arrests for the sale or distribution of allegedly obscene literature
increased 300% within a week of the Court's decisions.
77 See Lockhart and McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional
Standards,45 MINN. L. REv. 5 (1960) (classic advocating adoption oE a variable standard).
78 Semonche, supra note 56. The term "contextual" obscenity was used several times
by the Court in Ginzburg.
79 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
80 Id. at 419.
81 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502
(1966).
82 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 475-76 (1966).
83 Monaghan, supra note 56.
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Ginzburg v. United States, 4 involving the use of the mails to advertise
overtly erotic materials, provided the Court with an opportunity to eliminate specifically the Roth criteria as a possible defense for the sophisticated
smut peddler. Moreover, it has become a source of anxiety and apprehension among commercial distributors who deal only slightly in the erotic
materials market, particularly the comer bookstore operator. What Ginzburg held was unmistakenly plain: even if the material in question was
not obscene per se, but if it was marketed so as to appear as erotica, the
exploiter's own advertising would contextually infect the material with
obscenity. More precisely, in the words of the majority opinion:
Where an exploitation of interests in titillation by pornography Is
shown with respect to material lending itself to such exploitation
through pervasive treatment or description of sexual matters, such
evidence may support the determination that the material is obscene
even though in other contexts the material would escape such condemnation.8 5
Mishkin v. New YorkA8 involving the preparation, publication, and
possession for the purpose of sale of fifty books primarily depicting sadomasochism, fetishism, and homosexuality, held that where such materials
were "designed for and primarily disseminated to a clearly defined devient
sexual group, rather than the public at large, the prurient-appeal requirement of the Roth test is satisfied ... ."87 This decision expressly modified,
at least contextually, the Roth "average man" element. Moreover, the
fact that the exorcised books were "not innocent but calculated perveyance.. ."88 enabled the Court to construct from the materials themselves,
together with the testimony of its authors, that the requisite intent was
present to justify criminal liability.
While the Roth test originally suffered from questionable effectiveness
due to its former narrow application to works "utterly valueness" and
thereby not within the ambit of first amendment protection, Ginzburg
and Mishkin struck at the heart of the obscenity business: pandering"
for profit
Other Obscenity Legislation Problems
Attempts at obscenity control or suppression have employed both criminal and civil sanctions. Each approach has its peculiar problems. The
84 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
85 Id. at 475-76. (Emphasis added.)
86 383 US. 502 (1966).
87 Id. at 508.
88 Id. at 512. (Emphasis added.)
89 "Pandering" was the Court's term describing commercial exploitation through
advertising of obscene materials. Ginzburg v. United Statcs, 383 US. 463. 473 (1966).
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United States Supreme Court has allowed states and municipalities complete freedom of selection as to control measures, but the Court has
insisted upon certain minimum constitutional safeguards for the benefit of
book distributors and film exhibitors,
In Smith v. Californid,9 ° the Court held that scienter is a vital element
necessary to prove criminal liability. Such a requirement was designed to
preclude involuntary self-censorship to avoid the risk of possible criminal
liability and to compensate for the inherent ambiguities in any definition
of obscenity. 91 This rule protects the innocent distributor without provid.
ing any relief for the panderer whose own conduct satisfies the scienter
requirement.9 2 The criminal sanction has been most often associated with
magazine and book distribution obscenity regulation.
A different scheme has been developed for handling the movie obscenity
problems: prior restraint, review, and classification. The American experience with prior restraints has been a turbulent one, however, as Chief
Justice Warren so well expressed in his twenty-nine page dissent in Times
Film Corp. v. City of Chicago.9 3 Nevertheless, the majority in Times Film
held that film review procedures which employed prior restraints were not
unconstitutional per se, absent any showing of unreasonable restrictions on
individual liberty. The same Court later qualified its acceptance of reasonable prior restraints by expressly restricting the Times Film rule to motion
pictures, rationalizing that they have been generally believed to "possess
a greater capacity for evil, particularly among the youth of a community,
than other modes of expression."9 4 At least one lower federal court 5 was
quick to recognize that review board composition can materially affect
procedural reasonableness when it held the Times Film rule cannot
immunize a municipal ordinance which had "no standards for selection
of . . .Board [members] and no safeguards to preclude an entirely arbitrary judgement on its part."906 That court explained:
The recent Times Film decision does not provide carte blanche
authorization for ad hoc, unfair, abortive municipal licensing pro.
cedures. We reemphasize that it does hold that a city has the power to
impose a system of prior restraints on movie distribution, if it does so
properly. Chicago's procedure . . . [was] lacking in the requisite
97
elements of procedural due process.
90 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
91 See note, The Scienter Requirement in Criminal Obscenity Pyosecutions, 41 N.Y.U.L
REv. 791 (1966).
92 Ginzburg and Mishkin doctrines.
93 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
94 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (dictum).
95 Zenith Int'l Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 291 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1961).
96 Id. at 790.
97 Ibid.
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Recognizing a need for still further instruction for those using civil means
s
to control movie obscenity, the Supreme Court, in Freedman v. Aaryland,0
laid out five broad principles for the conduct of review procedures. The
minimum procedural safeguards which a movie censorship scheme must
possess were outlined as:
The censor must shoulder the burden of proof.
Valid final restraint must be based upon judicial determination.
Classification must be made within a reasonable time.
Prior restraint must be for the shortest period compatible with
sound judicial resolution.
(5) Prompt final resolution must be assured.

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

The Freedman requirements are designed to allow reasonable review procedures, but insure that the exhibitor's highly perishable property interest
will be afforded adequate protection from de facto censorship through
censor delay. The rule is unquestionably in keeping with the Court's
consistent application of the "balancing of interest" principle.
Examination of the evolution of the Court's position on obscenity control legislation will indicate that allegedly offensive material can be condemned only after categorizing it as either obscene by definition under
the Roth test or contextually obscene as illustrated by the Ginzburg and
Mishkin theories. Moreover, any control method employed must comply
with certain minimum procedural requirements designed to safeguard
distributors' rights. Perhaps the factor of most far-reaching significance
with regard to the Court's position on obscenity, however, is the fact that
the decisions reflect the effects of five distinct, first amendment philosophies.
While all predictions on future decisions and rationales can only be
speculative, no attempt even at speculation, much less recommendation of
a separate standard for children, can be logically advanced without at
least a rudimentary understanding of these five positions on the first amendment.
V.

OBSCENITY, THE FIRST A?MENDMENT,

AND

VIE S OF THE VARIOUS JUSTICES

Obscenity Regulation and Free Speech
Mr. Justice Brennan, in his article The Supreme Court and the MeildeJohn Interpretationof the First Amendment,9 9 has indicated the mechanics
employed by the Court in handling a first amendment problem. He stated
that "all schools of thought . . . are in substantial agreement . . . that
government has some power to regulate the 'how' and 'where' of the exercise of the freedom [of speech]."' 00 He thereafter outlined the three major
98 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
99 79 HAv. L. REv. 1 (1965).
100 Id. at 5.
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tests employed: (1) the redeeming social value test in the area of obscenity,
(2) the clear and present danger test, and (3) the balancing of interests
test. 0 1 Professor Kalven 102 thought he discerned in the New York Times
v. Sullivan'o3 decision an abandonment of the above mentioned tests, but
the facts have failed to bear this analysis out, 0 4 at least with respect to
the question of obscenity. Memoirs-Ginzburg-Mishkin'o all adhered to
Roth, revitalizing and even expanding upon the two-level "social value"
approach. But regardless of its willingness to adhere to its ten-year-old line
of reasoning, the Court is a long way from unanimity on the question of
reconciling its obscenity position with its over-all concept of the first
amendment.
Justices Black and Douglas have long been recognized as the "absolutists" in the field of the first amendment. 100 According to their beliefs, freedom of speech is inviolate for any reason. Mr. Justice Stewart's position in
the obscenity control area has been that only "hard-core pornography"' 0
may be regulated. His "I know it when I see it" approach 0" has borne
the brunt of many criticisms' 09 of the Court's obscenity position.
The primary Court spokesman in the field of obscenity has been Mr.
Justice Brennan, 110 who spelled out the two-level theory of the Roth
formula. With the exception of his dissenting position on the issue of
prior restraint as employed in movie censorship,"' Chief Justice Warren's
major objection to the Brennan philosophy on obscenity has been his
belief that local community mores, not the quasi-objective national standard of Roth, should be the common denominator in accordance with
which the basic formula should be interpreted. 112 Mr. Justice Harlan has
contended that a rational standard of offensiveness exists whereby he can
subjectively determine obscenity on a case-by-case basis. 113 Mr. Justice Clark
has characterized himself as having "'stomached' past [obscenity] cases for
101 Id. at 5-9.
102 Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the
First
103
104
105

Amendment," 1964 SUPREME COURT REVIEW 191, 217.

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Memoirs v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), reaffirmed the Roth dichotomy.
383 U.S. 413, 463 and 502 respectively.
100 Free speech is an absolute right guaranteed by the First Amendment.
107 Recognizable though undefinable according to Mr. Justice Stewart.
108 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (concurring opinion).
109 E.g., Krueger, supra note 2, at 511-12, 519.
110 Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinions for the court in Roth, Jacobellis,
Memoirs, Ginzburg, and Mishkin, all crucial decisions.
111 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 50-78 (1961) (dissent) (traced
court's traditional abhorrence of prior restraints on free speech).
112 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200 (1964) (dissent).
113 Id. at 204 (dissent).
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almost 10 years without much outcry."" 4 He broke his self-imposed abstention from comment, however, in Memoirs, to dissent with the comment
"[t]hough I am not known to be a purist-or a shrinking violet-this book
is too much even for me."'1 He reconciled his adherence to the Roth test
before 1966 to have been rationalized largely by applying a balancing of
interests approach to the social value test"L0GThe remaining members of
the Court have not written on the subject.
The Separate Standard Dicta

While the apparently irreconcilable positions on obscenity and the first
amendment of the various Supreme Court Justices would make even the
most dedicated constitutional analyst throw up his hands in despair, there
is one fact upon which there seems to be general agreement: the acceptability of protecting the impressionable young mind from obscenity by
separate means. In the Jacobellis case," 7 the Supreme Court restated its
position expressed in Butler v. Michigan 18s that youth protection might
best be achieved by separate laws:
State and local authorities might well consider whether their objectives
in this area [protection of young minds] would be better served by laws
aimed specifically at preventing distribution of objectionable material
to children, rather than at totally prohibiting its dissemination." 9
Moreover, Mr. Justice Brennan's use of the phrase "harmful to children"20
has been interpreted as indicating a willingness to accept an even more
stringent obscenity standard than Roth when considering materials distributed to young people. 2 1 This view is buttressed by Chief Justice
Warren's opinion in Jacobellis,joined in by Justice Clark, which observed
that material may well be "inoffensive under most circumstances but, at
the same time, 'obscene' in the extreme when sold or displayed to children." 12 2 Five separate justices in Jacobellis expressed a willingness to
accept a separate standard.123 This appraisal has certainly been borne out
in the Supreme Court's adoption in 1966 of the "variable obscenity"
114 Memoirs v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413, 441 (1966).
15 Ibid.
l10 Id. at 451.
117
118

Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 US. 184 (1964).
852 US. 380 (1957).

119 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964).
121

Ibid.
See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas. 366 F.2d 590, 598 (1966) (dictum).

122

Jacobeflis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 201 (1964).

12

Justices Brennan, Goldberg, Chief Justice Warren, Justices Clark and White.

120
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concept, which has long been advocated by Professors Lockhart and Mc24
Clure.1
VI.

CONSTITUTIONAL HURDLES FOR ANY SEPARATE STANDARD

Any separate obscenity standard designed to protect the young will be
confronted by the potential constitutional infirmities which face any general obscenity statute, as well as perhaps a few obstacles peculiar to a

specific separate standard. The traditional obstacles will be (1) vagueness,
(2) scienter, and (3) due process (both review procedures and board composition). The unique problems will involve (1) the Butler doctrine,12 5
(2) society's right to protect its youth, and (3) practical problems of dissemination regulation (what age limit and distributor responsibility in
determining a young patron's age).
Vagueness
Vagueness is a problem inherent in both civil and criminal legislation,
although its existence is more unacceptable in the latter.120 And as earlier
stated, obscenity is a problem more easily described than defined.1 27 However, the Court has offered considerable assistance in this area by way of
dictum, stating in Jacobellis that a youth protection plan like Rhode
Island's 28 might satisfy the constitutional requirement and in Mishkin that
29
the term obscenity in a statute is not unconstitutionally vague per se.'
124 Lockhart and McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional
Standards, 45 MINN. L. Rxv. 5 (1960). See Memoirs-Ginzburg-Mishkin, 383 U.S. 413, 463,
and 502 respectively. See generally Dibble, Obscenity: A State Quarantine to Protect
Children, 39 So. CAL. L. Rlv. 345 (1966); Fagan, Obscenity Control and Minors: The Case
for a Separate Standard, 10 CATHOLIC I W. 270 (1964).
125 Butler v. Michigan, 852 U.S. 380 (1957).
126 Vagueness is a violation of due process in either context, but is compounded in

the criminal case by precluding presence of scienter.
127 See Part III, supra.

128 R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 11-31-10 (1956):
Every person who shall wilfully or knowingly sell, lend, give away, show, advertise
for sale or distribute commercially to any person under the age of eighteen (18)
years . . . any pornographic motion picture, or any still picture or photograph or
any book ....
the cover or content of which exploits, is devoted to, or is principally
made up of descriptions of illicit sex or sexual immorality or which is obscene,
lewd, lascivious, or indecent, or which consists of pictures of nude or partially
denuded figures posed or presented in a manner to provoke or arouse lust or
passion or to exploit sex, lust or perversion for commercial gain or any article or
instrument of indecent or immoral use shall - . . be punished ....
This statute has subsequently been revised slightly to include the pandering test of
Ginzburg, R.I. Ga. LAws ANN. § 11-31-10 (Supp. 1966). State v. Settle, 90 R.I. 195,
199, 156 A.2d 921, 924 (1959) (upheld as constitutional). Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 189 (1964) (cited Settle favorably). See generally Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the
Model Penal Code, 63 COLUm. L. REV. 669, 677, 680-81 (1963) analyzing § 251A(3) (1962
Prop. Off. Draft) which incorporates the Rhode Island approach.
129 Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 506 (1966). For a listing of those state codes
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Scienter
There are two means by which a skillful draftsman can avoid the scienter
problem: definiteness, such as above described, and an antecedent in rem
evaluation of questionable material prior to the imposition of criminal
sanctions. The Massachusetts statute 30 provides an excellent example of
the in rem approach. Separate condemnation of the material-in the separate standard context, as its impact would affect young people-would
permit for the benefit of distributors the pre-publication identification of
those materials which should not be disseminated to young people. Scienter
would thereafter be a conclusive presumption and violation with scienter
would place the offender within the Ginzburg-Mishkin category of selfcondemned panderers.
The Evaluation Process:Board Composition and JudicialReview
The question of values is perhaps the most critical factor involved in any
obscenity control plan. Whose values should constitute the Jacobellis national standard? Only experts can do justice both to society's needs and
distributors' constitutional rights. And even experts are not exempt from
criticisms such as: "The censors, the legislators, the prosecutors, the police,
the judges, and all the forces of repression have had their day since 1800;
and it is time another approach was tried."'' While criticism will always
be in order, more responsible evaluation of the expert's role in obscenity
control has been expressed by several writers who basically conclude:
On past occasions, the experts have reflected every prejudice of their
communities, and doubtless they will again. But if the determination

of obscenity is to be attempted on any rational, as distinguished from
a merely instinctive, basis, the experts can help the community to solve

this problem, as well as it is likely to be solved.
132
And it warrants solution.

At least one author has presented an outstanding illustration of the value
of a blue-ribbon review board.' 33 He described how Chicago solved its
classification problems 3

4

by assembling panels composed of two literary

experts and a psychologist. The literary experts were unquestionably well
qualified to determine the literary merit of a particular work, employing
following the New York type no-definition of obscenity approach see Note, 54 Gro. L.J.
1379, 1404 n.168 (1966).
13o MAss. Gr.. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 28D (1959).
131

Murphy, The Value of Pornography,I0 WAYNE L. R1v. 655, 680 (1964).

Frank, Obscenity: Some Problemsof Values and the Use of Experts, 41 WAM. L. REV.
631, 675 (1966). See also Comment, 18 HSTwINGs L.J. 161 (1966) (use of expert testimony
132

for judicial review).
133 Frank, supra note 132.
'34

ibid.
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the Roth formula; the psychologist could assay the distributor's intent
in light of the Ginzburg-Mishkin contextual test. What another author
labelled the "marriage of obscenity per se and obscenity per quod"' 85 then
established whether or not the work in question fell within the "social
value" category protected by the first amendment. Chicago assembled three
panels of three members, composed as above, and presented to each panel
separately a number of possible obscene works which ranged across the
spectrum from Lady Chatterley's Lover to deviant comic books. 180 The
results were startling: only one minor disparity between ratings with complete uniformity among panels as to which works were obscene and which
137
possessed at least some redeeming social value.
Separate standard legislation should expressly incorporate the Freedman
safeguards whenever prior restraint is employed in conjunction with review
board classification. Preferential muncipal and state court docket consideration rules should at the same time be incorporated into existing court
rules and the obscenity legislation to preclude such a situation as now confronts the Dallas movie ordinance. It has been held to comply with Freedman as a matter of past practice, 13 although no express speedy review
procedures exist at the state court level. 180
Unique Problems Associated with Separate Standard Legislation
Particular care should be exercised by separate standard drafters that they
insure none of the plan's procedures or sanctions infringe upon adult
rights guaranteed by the first amendment and the Butler rule. There is no
reason or need for the type of sanction which the Dallas ordinance contained
to cope with recalcitrant exhibitors: license suspension to show "adult only"
140
movies.
The restriction of first amendment rights of minors has long been held
justifiable and defensible under the Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts'4' doctrine, which held that society has an overriding responsibility
to its youth. That case reinforced the state's role as parens patriae, stating:
The state's authority over children's activities is broader than over
like actions of adults ....A democratic society rests, for its continuance,
135 Monaghan, Obscenity, 1966: The Marriage of Obscenity Per Se and Obscenity Per
Quod, 76 YALE LJ. 127 (1966).
136 Frank, supra note 132.
137 Ibid.
138 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 249 F. Supp. 19, 25 (N.D. Tex. 1965), afJ'd,
366 F.2d 590, 599-601 (5th Cir. 1966).
139 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 366 F.2d 590, 610 (1966) (dissent)
(municipal ordinance does not have precatory weight in state courts).
140 DALLAS, Tax., REv. CODE ch. 46A, § 6 (1965). Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of
Dallas, 249 F. Supp. 19, 25 (N.D. Tex. 1965) (voided 46A-6 as contra Butler v. Michigan,
352 U.S. 380 (1957)).
141 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (dictum).
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upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full
maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this [interest]
against impeding restraints and dangers within a broad range of selection.142
Protection of its youth from the infection of obscenity is the major premise
underlying the development of separate standard legislation. If such use
of a state's police power, exercised in a reasonable manner, is constitutionally
unacceptable, then there can be no valid rationalization of any Supreme
Court position on the question of obscenity in general.
The most troublesome problem inherent in establishing a separate
standard is that of selecting the age limit. The Dallas movie ordinance
stipulated that 16 and under was the age group requiring protection from
obscenity. 143 The New York dissemination statute' 44 established an 18
year and under class to be protected. So also did the Rhode Island statute'48
cited by the JacobellisCourt. 146 Whatever age cut-off between the protected
class and the unrestricted adult audience is ultimately adopted, it should
be uniform throughout the United States in order to conform to the
Jacobellis criteria for a national community standard. It would seem that
at least some significance should be attributed to the time at which a young
man must register with his draft board-18 years of age. It should be noted
that this is the normal age at -which American youngsters complete their
secondary education. This is the age at which they face perhaps the greatest
decisions of their lives: college, the civilian work force, or the military
(not to speak of many who also choose this time in their lives to marry).
Also, the public school sex education programs 147 terminate with high
school graduation. For these reasons, it would seem that 18 years and under
should encompass the class to which the state owes its responsibility as
parens patriae.
Dissemination controls would have to be placed upon the distributor
140
(as does the New York law) 148 or exhibitor (as does the Dallas ordinance).
This could be accomplished much as it is with alcohol sales: patrons would
have to show proof of age before being admitted to a theater showing a
film classified as obscene for young people or before being allowed to
purchase published materials within the restricted classification.
142 Id. at 168.
143 DALLAS, Tx., REv. CODE ch. 46, §

1(d) (1965).
N.Y. PEN. LAw § 484-i (McKinney Supp. 1965).
145 See note 128, supra.
146 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964).
147 See generally Friggens, The Case for Enlightened Sex Education, condensed from
Ta PTA MAGAzINE (May 1967) in Reader's Digest, May 1967, p. 73.
148 N.Y. PEN. LAw § 484-i (McKinney Supp. 1966).
149 DALLAS, Tx., Ray. CODE ch. 46. § 4 (1965).
144
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AN OUTUNE FOR A SEPARATE STANDARD

Although any proposed outline must of necessity be sketchy since statutory
format and language will differ according to respective state and municipal
formats, nevertheless, it is possible to set forth the bare essentials of what
would seem to be the most flexible and defensible separate obscenity
standard for youths under 18 years of age.
Purpose and Scope
This standard is designed to protect young people under the age of 18
from material obscene as to them. However, this statute should not be
construed to equate sex with obscenity. The target of this standard is that
small amount of material which depicts not sex-in-reality, but sex-in-fantasy.
The scope of this standard is primarily (but not exclusively) 5 0 intended to
police published materials and motion pictures.
Obscenity as to Young People: Definitional Guidelines
The Roth test, as amplified in Memoirs and modified to apply to young
people, constitutes the basic formula. Three elements must coalesce:
(1) The dominant theme of the material taken as a whole must appeal to
a prurient interest in sex of the average American young person
under age 18.
(2) The material must be patently offensive to the average young person
because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the
description or representation of sexual matters.
(3) The material must be utterly without redeeming social value when
viewed by an audience under the age of 18.
Specifically objectionable, but by no means exclusively, are any photographs,
motion pictures, representations, or published materials which describe or
depict
(1) The genitals in a state or condition of sexual arousal, or
(2) Acts of masturbation, homosexuality, or sexual intercourse, or
(3) Acts of physical contact which associated with the purpose of sexual
stimulation, or
(4) Any other words, actions, or fetishes specifically intended to portray
a dearly deviant course of conduct designed to generate abnormal
sexual response.
150 It seems conceivable that such a general prohibitive statute might be used to
deny admittance of young persons under 18 to strip shows at the county fair and other
"live" night club style entertainment which could be categorized as obscene for young
persons.
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A Contextual Caveat

In order that any doubts might be dispelled, this statute should be
construed to incorporate the Ginzburg-Mishkin contextual obscenity principles, as modified to apply to persons under the age of 18, whereby an
attempt to exploit commercially the prurient interests of young persons
through marketing or advertising media may constitute prima fade evidence
of pandering sufficient to substantiate criminal prosecution notwithstanding
the actual classification applied to the marketed materials.
ClassificationProcedure

There shall be six basic steps in the classification process:
(1) Distributors and exhibitors are required to submit for review any
publication or film for which they are personally unable to classify
in accordance with the spirit and letter of this ordinance. The board
shall have authority to initiate classification action, if necessary.
(2) Those materials submitted for board review will be evaluated by a
(state or municipal) panel composed of at least two literary experts
and one psychologist and classified in accordance with this standard.
(3) Should any distributor or exhibitor disagree with the board classification, he shall have two days within which to file a written objection,
stating his reason for objection.
(4) Within two days following receipt of notice of objection, the review
panel must either acquiese in the distributor's or exhibitor's objection
or file for a temporary injunction.
(5). Should an application for a temporary injunction be filed, an in
rem judicial proceeding must be commenced within 14 days of the
filing date or the classification objected to becomes void.
(6) Only in extraordinary circumstances should a temporary injunction be
granted and in no case should it remain in effect in execess of 30 days
from the filing of the application for judicial review. Speedy appellate
review must be expressly provided for in the state rules of civil
procedure. It is the intent of this statute that every effort be made
to review rapidly those classifications which are contested, in order to
minimize both costs and delays to the disseminator.
ControlProcedure

The disseminator is charged with constructive notice of the final classification upon completion of judicial review. Such notice shall be construed to
satisfy scienter requirements in any subsequent criminal prosecution. With
respect to those materials finally classified as obscene for persons under age
18, the disseminator shall be required to (a) indicate dearly such classification whenever advertising such material and (b) restrict access to such
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materials to persons over the age of 18. Age can be verified, as is done by
liquor store operators, by positive identification. Any person violating this
statute shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
VIII.

CONCLUSION AND

SEQUEL

Conclusion
It would seem that a well drafted and reasonably administered separate
obscenity standard for persons under the age of 18 should satisfy society's
primary need for protecting youth through obscenity legislation. Should
this scheme be accepted by the United States Supreme Court, the court
might avoid Roth altogether and rely solely on the Ginzburg-Mishkin
contextual obscenity doctrine for whatever nuisance protection society-atlarge might require. Adoption of separate standards (for children and for
coping with pandering) would enable the Court to escape its role as "supercensor," since a definition of obscenity would not be required. Thereafter,
obscenity legislation cases could be decided either (a) on the basis of selfconfessed obscenity pandering in the case of the adult society-at-large or (b)
on the basis of compliance with procedural due process under the separate
standard for youth. The Court, on May 8, 1967, further reinforced this
assumption when it stated in its latest obscenity decisions:M1
In none of the cases was there a claim that the statute in question
reflected a specific and limited state concern for juveniles . . .. And
in none was there evidence of the sort of "pandering" which the Court
found significant in Ginzburg v. United States (citation omitted).15 2
Neither situation would require the Court to attempt to define obscenity
by independent review of the material or to soil the pages of its reports
with the luridly descriptive passages from condemned material in the course
of justifying its decision. Moreover, the disseminator would be provided
with certainty as to exactly what he must do or not do to avoid individual
liability.
Sequel
No amount of governmental protection of young persons from the
distorted approach to sex inherent in obscene materials can replace the
151 Redcup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967). The Court originally limited review
on these cases to the question of "obscenity" as described in Memoirs v. Attorney General,
883 U.S. 413, 418 (1966). They were reversed, however, upon procedural grounds
(Redcup and Austin for lack of scienter; Gent for vagueness and prior restraint). The
majority's agonizing attempt to avoid the obscenity question was severely criticized by
the dissent:
In short, the Court disposes of the cases on the issue that was deliberately excluded
from review, and refuses to pass on the questions that brought the cases here.
(Harlan, J., joined by Mr. Justice Clark).
386 U.S. at 772.
152 Id. at 769.
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responsibility of parent and school to provide American youth with a
wholesome introduction to sex-in-reality. As Dr. Mary S. Calderone, physidan, grandmother, and executive director of the Sex Information and
Education Council of the United States, so well stated:
Enlightened sex education today is not just the facts about reproduction, and certainly not education about the act of sex. It deals with
one's total sexuality: what makes you a man or a woman; the way you
think, act, dress, marry. Sex is not something we do, but something we
are, and the goal of [sex education] is simple: the use by every individual of his sexual faculties in responsible ways in all of his relation3
ships, not just the sexual ones.15
It is this writer's belief that, with the benefit of wholesome sex education
and protection during the educational process from the unscrupulous
panderer of obscenity, the average American youth can be allowed to enter
adult life with a philosophy concerning sex which will be a credit to both
himself and his society.

E.L.S.
153

Friggens, supra note 147, at 74.
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